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Abstract 
Massively Multiplayer Online Role Playing Games (MMORPGs) are virtual environments that allow players to socialize, compete, 
contribute, produce and consume goods leading to an intricate lifestyle resembling real world. With millions of subscribers 
populating these virtual worlds, investing their time and effort to hoard virtual assets, the boundary between real and virtual 
economies has become obscure. Players improvise their economy and build their character over a long period, in the persistent 
virtual world. Hence, each login and subsequent session must be secured. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is used to establish a 
secure channel for communicating user credentials with the game server. However, PKI is complex, expensive and difficult to 
deploy. Hierarchical Identity Based Encryption (HIBE) provides a simple, scalable, certificate-free and efficient alternative to the 
conventional public key infrastructure. This paper investigates the architecture models, security threats and existing security 
solutions in MMORPGs. The suitability of HIBE for the establishment of secure login session in MMORPGs, is analyzed using 
three HIBE protocols. The scalability of the protocols were scrutinized, based on parameters like security degradation, public 
parameter size, ciphertext size and private key size. Computational complexity in terms of encryption and decryption overhead for 
each protocol, was approximated. Based on the results, the most suitable HIBE protocol for securing the login sessions in 
MMORPGs was derived. 
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1. Introduction 
     The emergence of Massively Multiplayer Online Role Playing Games (MMORPGs) has redefined gaming 
experience for millions of players worldwide. Unlike traditional console-based role playing games, MMORPGs offer 
alliance with numerous players across the globe. The game is featured in a Persistent State World (PSW), which will 
be continuously evolving even when individual users are logged off. Users will be assigned game characters from 
their online identities. Each player builds his character over a long period of time through a sequence of activities that 
affects the entire virtual game environment. After each login, the progress of the player will be saved. The players are 
often rewarded with virtual bounties in the form of currency or wealth. If the login details of a player can be 
intercepted, it might provide monetary benefits to an adversary. This is due to the fact that, often, virtual and real 
world bounties cross-over, creating serious security breaches leading to economic loss, cheating and identity theft. For 
instance, virtual currency can be exchanged for real items. People might use real money to buy virtual items through 
e-commerce sites like e-bay or even purchase property in online gaming world. These bizarre scenarios has nurtured 
a new type of risk called virtual crime. To prevent man-in-the-middle attack, the data related to login process should 
be encrypted. 
 
     The rest of the paper is organized as follows, section 2 provides an insight into the different architectural models 
in MMORPGs. Section 3 describes the security threats in MMORPGs. Section 4 elaborates the existing security 
solutions. Section 5 gives an account of the applicability of HIBE in securing MMORPGs, followed by a discussion 
about three HIBE protocols. The scalability of each protocol is analyzed, to identify the most appropriate scheme. 
Section 6 documents the concluding remarks. 
2. Massively Multiplayer Online Role Playing Games 
     MMORPGs can support over 10,000 players simultaneously in the persistent virtual world. The game environment 
consist of static components like landscape, mountains, oceans and other terrestrial objects. The rest of the entities 
like the players’ characters, objects that are affected by the players’ actions and system monitored features like 
weather, forms the dynamic part1. The state of these dynamic entities are vital to the evolvement of the game. Player 
activities are initially processed by the client and then transmitted to the server. The server updates the game 
environment, after calculating the new game state resulting from the user input and the game logic. Depending on 
where the virtual world and its game states reside, MMORPGs can be implemented using client-server or peer-to-peer 
architectures. 
2.1. Client Server Architecture 
     Client server architecture is by far the most commercially accepted network architecture model, with a host of 
MMORPGs like EVE Online, Runscape, Second Life, Lord of the Rings Online, World of Warcraft1 and Quake 
adopting it. The server maintains the virtual world and controls the application logic, user input processing as well as 
state updates. The client software running at the user side is capable of sampling the user inputs and transmitting them 
to the server for processing. It also displays visual and audio effects based on state updates from the server. In the 
popular World of Warcraft, the animations, graphics, sound effects and maps will be incorporated into the fat client, 
to offload a part of the functionalities from the server. Despite the increase in user side storage requirement, this 
facilitated real-time interaction between clients and the servers. The clients and servers constantly communicate with 
each other at high frequency, to maintain the persistent game state uniformly across all participants.  However, due to 
bandwidth limitations, server cannot send updates for each state change to each client. Instead, the server broadcasts 
snapshots of the current virtual world state at constant intervals, to all clients.  
 
     Due to network delay, packet loss18 and bandwidth limitations, providing an interactive, graphically rich gaming 
experience is challenging. Several techniques like sharding, zoning and instancing, have been used to distribute the 
load across multiple servers17. Sharding increases scalability by running different copies of the virtual world on 
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different server clusters, each supporting a group of players. Since MMORPGs have world-wide subscribers, setting 
up server clusters at disperse geographic locations eases scalability and access speed. Players in the same shard interact 
with each other, without any knowledge of the game state in other shards. Zoning divides the virtual world based on 
its geographic boundaries, so that each part can be separately handled by different server clusters. The state of each 
zone will be maintained and updated by the corresponding servers. Usually the boundaries of the zones will be 
invisible to the players and they will be unaware of the game state beyond their zones. However, researches have 
proven the possibility of making zone boundaries transparent to players, by synchronizing game states across the zone 
servers17. Instancing creates shards of a particular zone. Several instances of the same zone will be maintained to 
further reduce load and the players in each instance interact among themselves. 
2.2. Peer-to-Peer Architecture 
     In client-server architecture, the server authoritatively handles the game states and game logic. Setting up and 
maintaining the server is expensive. Due to the massiveness of MMORPGs, servers will ultimately be burdened with 
the sheer load of computations and data processing. Hence, peer-to-peer (P2P) architectures are being considered as 
an alternative. In P2P architectures, the clients share the resources and game logic, they constantly communicate with 
each other to synchronize the game state. However, due to the lack of a centralized authority to monitor the game 
state, maintain the repositories and mitigate conflicts, cheating attacks are more common in P2P architectures. Due to 
storage and bandwidth limitations, it will be infeasible to maintain and update the entire virtual world in every client.  
Hence, similar to zoning, the virtual world can be divided into regions. Separate peer groups can work in specific 
regions, periodically sharing their overall state with peer groups in other regions. Researches in P2P architectures are 
still in its infancy and it has not been adopted for commercial MMORPGs. 
3. Security Threats in MMORPGs 
     Time and state synchronization problems are rampant in MMORPGs. Hence, a common genre of attacks in 
MMORPGs is cheating through state manipulation. Fat clients are the window to a player’s virtual world and is 
equipped with rich functionalities that can be exploited by hackers or players themselves. Players often resort to these 
attacks to gain unfair advantage in the game. Attacks include delaying outgoing packets, suppressing updates, 
modifying timestamps and sending inconsistent updates. This can lead to inappropriate database states and race 
conditions. Clients can even be manipulated to acquire capabilities like teleporting, visibility through objects and 
identification of opponents’ co-ordinates14. While individual players gain advantage through cheating, there are other 
disturbing trends in gaming industry that has grown into a global menace. 
     Many MMORPGs like World of Warcraft and Second Life, offers a virtual economy to sell and purchase virtual 
assets and goods in the game world. Second Life’s virtual currency Linden Dollars9, can be exchanged for real money 
in third party currency exchange websites10. The Internet Gaming Entertainment Ltd (IGE) stages the purchase of 
virtual commodities for real money and a huge share of its revenue is due to the exchange of World of Warcraft gold. 
Hence, MMORPGs have become a safe haven for money laundering11. These games offer virtual credits in exchange 
of real money. Criminals can transfer virtual currencies across international borders, and then encash it conveniently 
as a gold farmer, leaving no trace for law enforcement agencies16. Often legitimate user accounts are targeted and 
hacked or intercepted for nefarious activities. 
4. State-of-the-art Solutions 
     State modifications can be limited by resetting client state, when the client sessions become out of sync with the 
game server. Traffic analysis can also be used to identify suspicious activities10. Client modification can be restricted 
by calculating and storing the hash of each game data file in the client computer. Before the client is allowed access 
to the game world, the server verifies the checksum with the known-good hash, for possible modifications. Code 
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encryption can be used to prevent modification of compiled critical code at client side. The code will be decrypted at 
run-time and can be further secured using virtualization.  
     Encryption of data packets prevents man-in-the-middle attacks as well as packet sniffing. Communication can be 
secured using an asymmetric encryption algorithm like RSA, provided, the key size is sufficiently large (2048 bits 
and above)7. This can lead to serious performance overheads. A more common practice is the use of Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI)21. PKI uses asymmetric encryption to establish a secure communication channel between users 
and to exchange a symmetric key for the later part of the communication. PKI follows a hierarchical structure and 
consist of Certificate Authorities (CAs) that issue signed certificates to other entities. Each certificate will be encrypted 
by the certificate authority’s private key and consist of the valid public key of the corresponding user. The symmetric 
key can be exchanged using the authentic public keys, to establish a secure channel12. A common combination of 
asymmetric and symmetric algorithms used in gaming environments is, RSA and AES respectively. Other protocols 
like Diffie-Hellman and Blowfish algorithms can also be used. Usually encryption will be used in MMORPGs to 
securely transmit login credentials to the server. 
 
Fig. 1. Establishing a secure login using Public Key Infrastructure 
     Since PKI involves lot of entities like certificate authorities, certificate directories and certificate revocation lists, 
it is expensive, difficult to maintain install and deploy. MMORPGs support thousands of users in a shared virtual 
environment and the communication overhead for establishing a secure channel using PKI is high. But without PKI, 
the authenticity of a public key cannot be verified. Any attacker can masquerade as a genuine entity and can create 
key pairs. If any valid identity of the user, like e-mail id, personal identification number or IP address could be used 
as a public key, PKI could be much simpler. Certificate authorities, certificate directories, certificate revocation lists 
and certificate directory look ups could be eliminated altogether. Fig. 1 illustrates the establishment of a secure login 
session using conventional PKI model, in a MMORPG.  
5. Investigations of HIBE in Massively Multiplayer Online Role Playing Games 
     Identity Based encryption (IBE) is an improvised version of public key encryption. IBE allows the public key to 
be derived directly from authentic user identities like e-mail ID, personal identification number or IP address. The 
sender can directly encrypt the message using the public key derived from recipient identity, without obtaining any 
digital certificates to prove the validity of the recipient’s public key. Users can register with a Private Key Generator 
(PKG), which is a trusted third party like the CA. The PKG generates system public parameters, which will be 
available in the public domain for all participants. After verifying the user identity, PKG will issue private key 
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corresponding to the identity, using a master secret key known only to the PKG. The concept of Identity Based 
Encryption was first proposed by Shamir20 in 1984. Boneh and Franklin constructed a practical IBE scheme in 2001, 
based on bilinear pairings on elliptic curves3. Due to the absence of sub-exponential discrete log algorithms, the 
security of a 160 bit elliptic curve is approximately equivalent to that of a 1024 bit finite field13. Hence, compared to 
the asymmetric algorithms used in PKI, IBE provides better security at smaller key size. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Establishing a secure login using Identity Based Encryption 
 
     Fig. 2 demonstrates the establishment of a secure login session using IBE scheme, in a MMORPG. Owing to the 
whopping subscriber base of MMORPGs, a single PKG cannot handle the load of verifying the credentials of players 
and servers, to generate private keys for all the entities. To increase scalability of IBE, Gentry and Silverberg6 
developed Hierarchical Identity Based Encryption (HIBE) scheme. HIBE follows a tree structure with a root PKG 
(R_PKG), which generates the system parameters, defines message space ( , ciphertext space  and selects root 
master secret. Next level consist of Domain level PKGs (D_PKGs), these PKGs must obtain system parameters from 
R_PKG. Domain level PKGs cannot generate any system parameters. Each D_PKG can select a random secret key. 
A PKG (R_PKG or D_PKG) with identity defined by ID tuple ሼܫܦଵǡ ǥ ǡ ܫܦ௞ሽ , can create private keys for its 
descendants ሼܫܦଵǡ ǥ ǡ ܫܦ௞ǡ ܫܦ௞ାଵሽ, using its secret key and system parameters. 
 
     In an MMORPG, players in a particular instance, zone, shard or region might interact with each other through chat 
messages. These chat messages are logged by the server and forwarded to the recipients. Private chats can be 
intercepted by attackers or players, to gain unauthorized state information. HIBE facilitates encryption of messages 
between participating users in domains. To encrypt a message ܯ א(, the sender uses system parameters, ID tuple of 
the recipient ሼܫܦଵǡ ǥ ǡ ܫܦ௞ǡ ܫܦ௞ାଵሽ and computes ciphertext ܥ א 	×This encrypted message will be sent to the game 
server. In HIBE, the ciphertext can be decrypted by the recipient with identity ሼܫܦଵǡ ǥ ǡ ܫܦ௞ǡ ܫܦ௞ାଵሽ, as well as its 
ancestor D_PKG, with ID tuple ሼܫܦଵǡ ǥ ǡ ܫܦ௞ሽ6,2. Since the game server is authorized to view the messages, it is 
advantageous to add D_PKG functionalities into the game server as shown in fig. 3 (a). After decrypting and logging 
the message, D_PKG forwards the original ciphertext to the corresponding recipient in its domain. The recipient uses 
the private key corresponding to the ID tuple ሼܫܦଵǡ ǥ ǡ ܫܦ௞ǡ ܫܦ௞ାଵሽ, to decrypt the ciphertext and get back the message. 
However, in P2P architectures, individual peers cannot be entrusted with D_PKG functionalities, hence, as shown in 
fig. 3 (b), separate D_PKGs are required for serving private keys for peers in specific regions. 
 
     Our investigations reveal that, in a HIBE protocol, the communication overhead depends on the public parameter 
size, private key size and the ciphertext size. All participants must obtain the system public parameters generated 
solely by the R_PKG. The public parameters comprise of bilinear group elements, optional random elements in the 
finite field, as well as, a description of the ciphertext space and message space. In a HIBE protocol, each entity obtains 
its private key from the ancestor PKG. The size of the private keys might vary as the depth of the user in the hierarchy 
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increases6,2,19. Similarly, in some HIBE schemes, the ciphertext size increases as the depth of the recipient in the 
hierarchy increases6. All these factors affect the communication and storage overheads in HIBE protocols. 
Computation complexity depends mainly on the encryption and decryption overheads. 
 
Fig. 3. (a) HIBE in a virtual world divided into zones; (b) HIBE in a virtual environment divided into regions among peers. (R_PKG denotes the 
Root PKG and D_PKG denotes the Domain PKG) 
     Bilinear pairings, fixed base exponentiations, general exponentiations and hashing operations attribute to the 
overhead. Among these, bilinear pairing is the most computation expensive operation4 and a practical HIBE scheme 
must minimize the number of pairings during encryption and decryption. The security proof of a HIBE protocol is 
modeled as an adversarial game between a reduction algorithm that tries to solve a complexity assumption and a 
polynomial time adversary that attacks the HIBE scheme and succeeds if it can solve an instance of the underlying 
hardness assumption3. For a security parameter, if ݌ is the probability of solving the hardness assumption in time ݐand 
݌ᇱ is the probability of successfully attacking the HIBE scheme in time ݐᇱ, then, the protocol is said to have a tight 
reduction if ݌ ൎ ݌ᇱ and ݐ ൎ ݐᇱ. However, if ݌ᇱ ൌ ܿǤ ݌, for some large coefficient ܿ , then the scheme suffers a security 
degradation. For instance, if ݌ ൌ ʹିଵହ଴and ܿ ൌ ʹ଻ହ, then, the protocol can be compromised with a probability ݌ᇱ ൌ
ʹି଻ହ. There is a security degradation of at least 75 bits. Hence, a HIBE scheme with a tight reduction is desirable for 
better security. Considering all these facts, the characteristics of three HIBE algorithms are analyzed and compared in 
the next subsections, to derive the most suitable scheme for application in MMORPGs. The simulation results in Table 
6 of Guillevic’s work8, is used for estimating the storage and computation complexity of each protocol in Table 2. 
5.1. Gentry-Silverberg HIBE 
     The hardness assumption, computational and communication complexity of Gentry-Silverberg HIBE, was 
analyzed. The scheme is based on standard bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption and is constructed in the random oracle 
model. It uses symmetric pairing of the form ܩଵ ൈ ܩଵ ՜ ܩ், hence is implemented on inefficient and less secure15 
supersingular (SS) curves. The protocol uses hash functions modelled as random oracles to map user identities to a 
bilinear group element. The scheme provides full security against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks. However, the 
private key and ciphertext size grows linearly with the depth of the user in the hierarchy. The root PKG is at level 0. 
The scheme suffers a security degradation of ܱሺݍ௛Ǥ ݍ௞௅ሻǡ where ݍ௛ is the number of admissible hash queries andݍ௞ is 
the number of private key queries in the adversarial game, ܮ  is the maximum number of levels. The security 
degradation increases exponentially with the maximum number of levels in the HIBE. The computational complexity 
also increases linearly with the depth of the recipient in the hierarchy. Hence, the protocol is suitable for a HIBE with 
lesser number of levels and correspondingly for multiplayer games with smaller subscriber base. The values in Table 
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1, illustrates the individual group elements in the public parameters, keys and ciphertext of each protocol. The 
algebraic group operations during private key extraction, encryption and decryption is also included in the table. 
Table 1. Number of group elements comprising the public parameters, private keys and ciphertext of each scheme, along with the algebraic group 
operations during key extraction, encryption and decryption. ܧ௫- Exponentiation in group ܩ௫, P- Pairing, L- maximum depth, ݈-current depth. 
HIBE Scheme Public 
Parameter Size 
Private Key 
Size 
Ciphertext Size Algebraic group operations 
Key Extract. Encrypt. Decrypt. 
Gentry-Silverberg6 ʹܩଵ ݈ܩଵ ݈ܩଵ, 1ܩ் (ʹ݈-1)ܧଵ ͳܧ், ݈ܧଵ (݈+1)ܧଵ,݈P 
Boneh-Boyen-Goh2 (L+4)ܩଵ (L-݈+2)ܩଵ ʹܩଵ, 1ܩ் (L+2)ܧଵ ͳܧ்,(݈+2)ܧଵ 2P 
Ramanna-Sarkar19 (L+4)ܩଵ 2(2(L-݈)+5)ܩଶ 3ܩଵ ,1ܩ்,1ܼ௣ (4(L-݈)+10)ܧଶ ͳܧ்,(4+݈)ܧଵ 3P 
5.2. Boneh-Boyen-Goh HIBE 
     The security degradation, computational and communication overheads of Boneh-Boyen-Goh HIBE was 
investigated. The investigations reveal that the scheme provides constant size ciphertexts, irrespective of the depth of 
the recipient in the hierarchy. The protocol is based on strong F-bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. It is implemented 
in the standard model and provides selective security against adaptive chosen plain text attacks. The protocol is 
designed in Type 1 setting, using symmetric pairing of the form, ܩଵ ൈ ܩଵ ՜ ܩ். The public parameter size is ܱሺܮሻ 
and for a user at depth݈, private key size is ܱሺܮ െ ݈ሻ, where L is the maximum number of levels in the HIBE. 
However, the scheme suffers a security degradation of ܱ൫ʹఒ௅൯, where ǌ is the security parameter. For the typical value 
of ߣ ൌ ʹͷ͸ bits, the security degradation is infeasibly high, as shown in Table 2. Hence, though the scheme is scalable, 
it cannot be deployed for establishing a secure login session in a MMORPG. 
 Table 2. Storage and computational complexity of each protocol, along with security degradation. (assuming ܮ ൌ Ͷ and ݈ ൌ ʹ) 
HIBE Scheme  Curve/ 
Security Level 
(group order) 
Storage Complexity (in bits) Computation Complexity (in 
milliseconds) 
Security 
Degradation 
(ݍு ൌ ʹହ଴ǡ
ݍ௞ ൌ ʹଶହሻ 
Pub. Para. 
Size 
Priv. 
Key Size 
Ciphertext 
Size 
Key-
extract. 
Encrypt. Decrypt. 
Gentry-Silverberg6 SS/128 (prime) 3072 3072 6144 24.9ʒ 18.8ʒ 105.3 ܱሺʹଵହ଴ሻ 
Boneh-Boyen-Goh2 SS/128 (prime)  12288 6144 6144 49.8 35.4 80.4 ܱሺʹଵ଴ଶସሻ 
Ramanna-Sarkar19 BN/128 (prime)  2048 9216 4096 34.38 8.46 15.15 ܱሺʹଶହሻ 
ʒ In Gentry-Silverberg HIBE the cost of hashing into bilinear groups should be considered additionally, during key extraction and encryption.  
5.3. Ramanna-Sarkar HIBE 
     Analysis of Ramanna-Sarkar HIBE shows that the protocol is highly scalable and is appropriate for application in 
MMORPGs with exceedingly large subscriber base. The scheme is based on standard Symmetric eXternal Diffie 
Hellman Assumption (SXDH) and uses asymmetric type 3 pairings of the form ܩଵ ൈ ܩଶ ՜ ܩ் . Hence, it can be 
implemented on more efficient curves, like MNT4 and Barreto-Naehrig (BN)8. The protocol provides recipient 
anonymity. The security degradation is of the order, ܱሺݍ௞ሻ, where, ݍ௞is the number of private key queries in the 
security game19. The private key size decreases with the depth of the user in the hierarchy. Hence for users at maximum 
depth, the private key size will be minimum. The Gentry-Silverberg HIBE and Boneh-Boyen-Goh HIBE cannot be 
implemented at 128 bit security level, due to huge security degradation. At higher security levels, supersingular curves 
are less flexible and group sizes become infeasibly high5. Hence, asymmetric pairing based protocols with tight 
reduction, tends to outperform protocols designed using symmetric pairing5. The protocol has constant ciphertext size 
and lower public parameter size, therefore, the communication cost will be comparatively lower, improving response 
time in MMORPGs. 
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6. Conclusion 
     Massively Multiplayer Online Role Playing Games create a virtual environment that can be shared simultaneously 
by a large number of players. This paper analyses the architecture, security issues and existing security solutions in 
Massively Multiplayer Online Role Playing Games. MMORPGs provide a virtual environment in which players 
collaborate and compete with each other, to acquire bounties in the form of virtual currencies. The economy interaction 
between the real and virtual worlds, lead to fraudulent activities like money laundering. Since the players build their 
wealth and character over a long period of time in this genre of games, it is crucial to secure their login credentials. 
Identity Based Encryption is an efficient alternative to the conventional PKI for establishing a secure login session. 
To increase scalability of IBE for supporting the enormous subscriber base of MMORPGs, Hierarchical Identity Based 
Encryption can be used. In this paper, we discussed three different HIBE protocols and analyzed storage and 
computation complexity of each protocol, using prime order supersingular curve and Barreto-Neahrig curve, both at 
128 bit security level. The security degradation of each protocol was also investigated. Based on the results, Ramanna-
Sarkar HIBE provides a constant ciphertext size, irrespective of the depth of the recipient in the hierarchy. The public 
parameter size depends on the maximum number of levels in the HIBE and private key size is inversely proportional 
to the depth of the user in the hierarchy. Compared to the other HIBE protocols, the security degradation and 
computational complexity in Ramanna-Sarkar HIBE is minimal, making it highly scalable and ideal for application in 
MMORPGs.   
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